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The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 51–82 | Cite as

Dynamic coordinating non-equilibrium

  • Santiago J. Gangotena
Article

Abstract

Neo-Walrasian conceptualizations and DSGE models are incompatible with the emergence of coordination and discoordination in economic activity. While many conceptualizations stemming from the Austrian tradition are generally consistent with these fundamental problems, their process driven approach is hampered by the use of equilibrium constructs. This paper argues for the adoption of formal models that avoid this problem by addressing the following questions. Why should Austrian macroeconomists model? Where do models fit in with respect to pure and applied theory? How to model without equilibrium? To answer this final question I present a structure that aids in the construction and communication of such models.

Keywords

Economic methodology Agent based computational economics Neo Austrian Coordination 

JEL Classification

B41 B53 C63 P11 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Colegio de Administración y EconomíaUniversidad San Francisco de Quito USFQQuitoEcuador

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