The perils of privacy regulation

Abstract

Advocates of digital privacy law believe it is necessary to correct failures in the market for digital privacy. Though legislators allegedly craft digital privacy regulation to protect consumers, some advocates have understated the dangers that digital privacy law may engender. This paper provides evidence for Kirzner’s “perils of regulation” in the digital privacy arena. The regulatory process fails to simulate the market process, stifles entrepreneurial discovery, and creates opportunities for superfluous discovery. My research suggests that policy-makers should consider a more holistic accounting of the costs before imposing additional digital privacy regulation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Hirsch (2010) for a more comprehensive accounting of the ways that websites may collect information and of the parties who have a vested interest in information collected on the Internet.

  2. 2.

    Hirshleifer (1980) took issue with the Posnerian focus on “privacy” as “secrecy,” arguing that “privacy” should be defined more expansively, likening “privacy” to “autonomy.” For Hirshleifer, privacy as autonomy entails freedom from observation. I stick to the Posnerian conception.

  3. 3.

    Hirsch (2010) advocates a “co-regulatory” approach to protecting privacy in which governments and firms work cooperatively to set regulations. Incidentally, one of the most cited papers on the economics of co-regulation is an examination of its operation in the context of food safety economics (see Martinez et al. 2007).

  4. 4.

    Kirzner begins his discussion by exploring the “undiscovered discovery process.” He uses this terminology to highlight that what has been labeled a “market failure” is, in fact, an opportunity for entrepreneurial profit. Calls for regulation frequently follow from the belief that entrepreneurs are incapable of solving alleged market failures. The focus of this paper is not on how entrepreneurs may solve digital privacy problems (though such research is worthwhile). Rather, the focus of this paper is on the ways that digital privacy law distorts the entrepreneurial market process, and thus I begin my analysis by discussing the “unsimulated” rather than the “undiscovered” discovery process.

  5. 5.

    Note that a “security” risk differs from a “privacy” risk. The latter refers to the types of information I deal with in this paper: personal, but nonsensitive information. The former refers to sensitive information such as an individual’s credit card number.

  6. 6.

    The Directive also contains provisions for protecting against true invasions of property, such as credit card theft.

  7. 7.

    An early study (Gross and Acquisti 2005) of Facebook and other social media sites revealed that young users, on average, did not express a high desire for digital privacy or anonymity, suggesting that the aims of privacy legislators become quickly outdated.

  8. 8.

    The knowledge that ARGO aggregates is Hayekian in the sense that it is localized and dispersed, though not tacit.

  9. 9.

    For example, DuckDuckGo is a rapidly growing search engine that does not track individual’s queries.

  10. 10.

    Note that this paper focuses primarily on “privacy” risks, that is access to “nonsensitive” information, rather than on threats to “sensitive” information such as credit card theft. The latter fits more properly under the category of “cybersecurity.” What this section demonstrates, however, is the ironic fact that bureaucratic efforts to shield privacy may, in fact, result in graver threats to one’s own cybsersecurity.

  11. 11.

    This piece of legislation is based on the Obama Administration’s 2012 “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”

  12. 12.

    I am indebted to a 2015 blog post entitled “Innovation Death Panels and Other Shortcomings” by Geoffrey Manne and Ben Sperry at the blog “Truth on the Market” for the idea that the “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” exposes consumers to greater privacy risks.

  13. 13.

    As Hirsch (2010) documents, providing consumers with “access” to their information–what this bill would do–is a cornerstone of the 1973 Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) proposed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).

  14. 14.

    Once an Internet merchant has established a digital storefront, the marginal cost of acquiring and serving an additional customer is often very low.

  15. 15.

    Sands is a technology executive who has experience with large companies as well as several startups, including several directly involved in providing digital privacy solutions.

  16. 16.

    Note that Milberg et al. (2000) argue that one benefit of digital privacy law is that it would correct the “reactive” failures of private firms.

  17. 17.

    Obviously, the same conclusion holds for entrepreneurs in any country.

  18. 18.

    See, for example, Posner (1978, 1981), Stigler (1980), Bibas (1994), Clarke (1999), Lin (2002), Sarathy and Robertson (2003), Mayer-Schönberger (2010), Pavlou (2011), Pasquale (2012), and Scholz (2015).

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Correspondence to Caleb S. Fuller.

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Fuller, C.S. The perils of privacy regulation. Rev Austrian Econ 30, 193–214 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0345-0

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Keywords

  • Economics of digital privacy
  • Regulation
  • Market process

JEL Classification

  • K29
  • L51
  • B53