Notes
Though it should be noted that they did speak with Eugene Kontorovich and do cite this discussion and email correspondence. However, there is no means by which an interested reader could access these discussions.
References
Benson, B. (1989). The spontaneous evolution of commercial law. Southern Economic Journal, 55, 644–661.
Friedman, D. (1989). The machinery of freedom (2nd ed.). Chicago: Open Court.
Kontorovich, E. (2010). A Guantanamo on the sea: the difficulty of prosecuting pirate and terrorists. California Law Review, 98(1), 243–275.
Leeson, P. (2010). Rationality, pirates, and the law: a retrospective. The American University Law Review, 59(5), 1219–1230.
Rogers, D., Smith, A., & Wilson, B. (2013). Violence, access, and competition in the market for protection. The European Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 1–17.
Smith, A., Skarbeck, D., & Wilson, B. (2012). Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations. Social Choice and Welfare, 38(2), 325–353.
Smith, A., Houser, D., Leeson, P., & Ostad, R. (2014). The costs of conflict. The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 97, 67–71.
Snow, N. (2012). Rumrunners, hooligans, and politicians: essays on the political economy of intervention. Dissertation, George Mason University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hebert, D.J. John J. Pitney and John-Clark Levin, Private anti-piracy navies: How warships for hire are changing maritime security . Rev Austrian Econ 28, 365–369 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-014-0272-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-014-0272-x