The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 23–44 | Cite as

A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice

Reasserting the Austrian foundations of subjectivist political economy
Article

Abstract

In light of Wittman (1995) and Caplan (2007) this paper contends that the rational-choice approach to political science (“Public Choice theory”) has reached a dead end. By critiquing their treatment of rationality, knowledge assumptions, and views of the democratic process, an alternative is presented based on the core insight of the “Epistemic Primacy Thesis”. This subjectivist approach to political economy is introduced in light of an existing debate between the compatibility (or otherwise) of Austrian economics and Public Choice theory.

Keywords

Entrepreneurship Government failure Public choice Rational choice Subjectivism 

JEL Code

B52 B53 D83 H11 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ESCP EuropeLondonUK

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