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References that only include page numbers throughout the essay refer to contributions to Governance without a State?
See Powell and Stringham (2009) for a recent extensive review of the literature on the political economy of anarchy.
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I will come back to the problems faced by outside actors to contribute to welfare-increasing change of institutions they are not familiar with in Section 3.
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I gratefully acknowledge the support of the International Centre for Economic Research (ICER), where I wrote part of this paper. I also thank Benjamin Larin for his proofreading assistance.
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Fink, A. Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood meets positive political economy of anarchy: A review essay. Rev Austrian Econ 28, 93–105 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-012-0195-3