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Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood meets positive political economy of anarchy: A review essay

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Notes

  1. References that only include page numbers throughout the essay refer to contributions to Governance without a State?

  2. See Powell and Stringham (2009) for a recent extensive review of the literature on the political economy of anarchy.

  3. See Powell and Stringham (2009) for a recent extensive review of the literature on anarchy by political economists.

  4. I will come back to the problems faced by outside actors to contribute to welfare-increasing change of institutions they are not familiar with in Section 3.

  5. Gambetta (1993, 4) is anxious to point out that even when individuals are forced to pay for protection, it is not implied that the purchased protection is useless in the sense that it only “protects” against the provider of protection. For the customers paying for the received services may be a lesser evil.

  6. Williamson (2009) provides a detailed discussion of the knowledge and incentives problems faced by donors and recipients.

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Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the support of the International Centre for Economic Research (ICER), where I wrote part of this paper. I also thank Benjamin Larin for his proofreading assistance.

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Fink, A. Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood meets positive political economy of anarchy: A review essay. Rev Austrian Econ 28, 93–105 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-012-0195-3

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  • K40