Peter T. Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides an illuminating economic analysis of how pirates established governance structures regulating their organization. Leeson is successful in showing economic rationales for piratical institutions and adopts the view of the piratical enterprise as a for-profit business firm to further illustrate the point. This essay argues, however, that modern theories of the firm are not fully compatible with the nature of piratical organization. Rather, pirates seem to have suffered from problems much like those in traditional cooperatives, arising from organizing collective action and joint ownership of the means of production.
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Bylund, P.L. Piracy, Inc.—on the bearing of the firm analogy to pirate organization. Rev Austrian Econ 23, 299–305 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-010-0106-4
- Theory of the firm