Abstract
This paper is an exercise in the history of thought, which compares Austrian and neoclassical theories of the emergence of private property rights, and examines, in part, the extent to which Austrians can be said to offer a commonly-agreed upon explanation that parallels Carl Menger's exemplary story of the emergence of money. We address the sources of disagreement (and apparent conflict) among emergence theorists in both schools. We try to show that some of the disagreement hinges on an unclear meaning of the term “emergence,” which is resolvable, while other sources of disagreement are fundamental at the methodological level.
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Beaulier, S.A., Prychitko, D.L. Disagreement over the emergence of private property rights: alternative meanings, alternative explanations. Rev Austrian Econ 19, 47–68 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-006-6093-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-006-6093-9