The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 18, Issue 3–4, pp 325–342 | Cite as

The Institutional Prerequisites for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

  • Christopher J. CoyneEmail author


A successful post-conflict reconstruction is characterized by a self-sustaining liberal political, economic and social order that does not rely on external support. It is argued that the extent of reconstructed orders is constrained by their institutional prerequisites. These prerequisites—a shared ideology and ethic of individual and private property rights, a commitment to markets and the rule of law—are fundamental. Without these preconditions to serve as a foundation, reconstructed liberal orders will fail to be self-sustaining over time. It is argued that the viability of a shared ideology and ethic, and hence success, is directly dependent on the extent of horizontal ties in the post-conflict country. The main conclusion is that societies lacking adequate horizontal ties will require a high level of continual intervention and reconstruction efforts will have a lower probability of success.


nation building post-conflict reconstruction social capital social change state building 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHampden-Sydney CollegeHampden-Sydney
  2. 2.Research FellowMercatus CenterArlington

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