Abstract
This article applies Saari’s geometric methodology to assess how muchdifference the choice of a particular positional voting procedure makeson the election outcomes. The British 2001 parliamentary elections are usedas an illustration of the methodology. The election results as well as MORIinterview data are used to make inferences regarding the possibility ofthe Borda effect. Saari’s geometricrepresentation technique is resorted to in describing all possiblepositional voting outcomes in single-member constituencies where threecandidates are competing. Finally, two basic winning criteria are discussed.
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Nurmi, H., Suojanen, M. Assessing Contestability of Electoral Outcomes. Qual Quant 38, 719–733 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-004-4756-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-004-4756-9