Pork Belly Politics: The Moral and Instrumental Reasons Clients Donate to Patrons in a Rural Colombian Mayoral Election

Abstract

Why, in the context of a rural Colombian mayoral election, do poor clients donate goods and services to political campaigns? The literature on clientelism describes it as a political order in which politicians exchange resources or favors for political support. In this article, I describe the clientelist relationships and exchanges in a 2019 rural Colombian mayoral election, including what I call pork belly politics, where poor clients also donate scarce resources—most notably crispy fried pork belly—to patrons. Based on eleven months of ethnographic and interview data from before, during, and after the campaign, I show that elections are a crucial time for the rural poor to position themselves vis-à-vis the future mayor. Further, I show that the practices I describe are simultaneously instrumental, calculated to guarantee their access to needed public resources for the four-year term, and moral, rooted in a broader political culture based on norms of reciprocity. I explain the three levels of clientelist relationships that emerge during campaigns, and the practices and expectations at play in each. These findings add new depth to our understanding of rural politics and poverty, client agency, and the moral and instrumental dimensions of clientelist exchanges.