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Informatic analysis for hidden pulse attack exploiting spectral characteristics of optics in plug-and-play quantum key distribution system

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Abstract

Quantum channel loopholes due to imperfect implementations of practical devices expose quantum key distribution (QKD) systems to potential eavesdropping attacks. Even though QKD systems are implemented with optical devices that are highly selective on spectral characteristics, information theory-based analysis about a pertinent attack strategy built with a reasonable framework exploiting it has never been clarified. This paper proposes a new type of trojan horse attack called hidden pulse attack that can be applied in a plug-and-play QKD system, using general and optimal attack strategies that can extract quantum information from phase-disturbed quantum states of eavesdropper’s hidden pulses. It exploits spectral characteristics of a photodiode used in a plug-and-play QKD system in order to probe modulation states of photon qubits. We analyze the security performance of the decoy-state BB84 QKD system under the optimal hidden pulse attack model that shows enormous performance degradation in terms of both secret key rate and transmission distance.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the ICT R&D program of MSIP/IITP. [R-20150903-002203, Standardization for Quantum Key Distribution]

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  1. Heasin Ko

    Present address: Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Daejeon, Republic of Korea

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Electrical Engineering, KAIST, Daejeon, 34141, Republic of Korea

    Heasin Ko, Kyongchun Lim, Junsang Oh & June-Koo Kevin Rhee

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  1. Heasin Ko
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  2. Kyongchun Lim
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Correspondence to June-Koo Kevin Rhee.

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Ko, H., Lim, K., Oh, J. et al. Informatic analysis for hidden pulse attack exploiting spectral characteristics of optics in plug-and-play quantum key distribution system. Quantum Inf Process 15, 4265–4282 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-016-1400-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-016-1400-2

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