State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839

Abstract

This paper studies the practice of Müsadere in the Ottoman Empire. Müsadere refers to the expropriation of elites—often tax farmers or administrators—by the Sultan. This practice is interesting from both political economy and economic history perspectives as the Ottoman Empire continued to increase its reliance on it during the eighteenth century, a period when European states were investing in fiscal capacity and building bureaucratic tax systems. The main argument is that Sultans faced a “political Laffer curve:” if revenue is too low, the state collapses; if fiscal extraction is too high there is a rebellion and the Sultan risks losing power. While expropriations (müsadere) allow the Sultan to keep taxes low, they are vulnerable to provoking elites to invest in fugitive rather than (more productive) captive assets. We also show that the Sultan is more prone to target politically strong elites when his fiscal capacity is low.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the early modernity, the maximization of tribute or “absolute protection rent” was also one of the major reasons of empire-building through the use of brutal force and diplomacy among the European merchant and territorial empires. (see Pietri et al. 2017).

  2. 2.

    This is mainly where our paper differs from Karaman (2009). He explains the logic of provincial taxation in the Ottoman Empire by employing the aforementioned relationship within the context of fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He argues that the central administration was concerned not only about the size of taxation but also with its bargaining power vis-à-vis the delegates. In the eighteenth century, however, this relationship was more sensitive due to the increasing costs of wars on the center and increasing threat of confiscation on the elites.

  3. 3.

    Our paper is also related to Ma and Rubin (2019). We compare our paper with theirs in the conclusion section.

  4. 4.

    This distinction will be elaborated in Sect. 3.

  5. 5.

    For a historical analysis of state capacity literature, see Johnson and Koyama (2017), and for a critical survey of the literature in light of public choice theory, see Piano (2019).

  6. 6.

    This finding is based on an econometric analysis of what determined the sultan’s decision to confiscate. Using a novel dataset including 1017 cases of confiscation attempts during the period 1750–1839, Arslantaş (2018) employs a two-step approach to answer the above question mainly because there were two types of decisions observed in the process of confiscation. The first step started when one of the local administrators informed the center about a potential case of confiscation, while the second step ensued once the confiscator went to the location, prepare an inventory and send it to Istanbul for a final decision. Due to the lack of inventory, the information regarding the qualities of wealth was not available to the central government in the first step. Using multinomial logistic model, he shows that the likelihood of sending a confiscator to implement the confiscation process was negatively correlated with expected transport costs (proxied by a variable interacting distance from Istanbul and distance from major ports). The decision to fully confiscate in the second step was a function of net value and liquidity of wealth and bargaining power of the family.

  7. 7.

    For a detailed analysis of these procedures, see Arslantaş (2018, chapter 4).

  8. 8.

    It must be stressed that the Ottoman state was never centralized in the modern sense. Centralization-decentralization dichotomy, however, is still useful when considered in relative terms, that is, the eighteenth century was more decentralized than previous two centuries.

  9. 9.

    By elites, we mean those elites in the fiscal business. In the 18th century, people under the risk of confiscation were tax farmers who bought the rights of tax collection of tax units for lifetime. They were supposedly making a lump sum payment which followed by annuities. In this respect, they were the agents of the Sultan (Çizakça 1996). Although it was not uncommon that they were engaged with other economic activities such as international trade and commercial agriculture, they were generally collecting taxes from peasants, miners and artisans (Yaycıoğlu 2016).

  10. 10.

    A way to understand the difference between captive and fugitive assets is to assume that tracking and monitoring costs borne by the Sultan to capture a fugitive asset are infinite. Consequently, the Sultan cannot capture fugitive assets. By contrast, direct costs associated with the confiscation of captive assets are negligible.

  11. 11.

    The archival records of the correspondence between the central government and the confiscator clearly show that the ability of the Sultan to confiscate was not equal for every kind of property. The center is understood to have ordered confiscators to make further and more detailed searches especially in cases it was not satisfied with the total value. These searches have mostly remained inconclusive. To use an example, when the wealth of Çapanoğlu Ahmed Paşa, the head of a prominent tax-farmer family based in central Anatolia, was confiscated, the center reached the conclusion that the family members could have escaped some property from the confiscator. The governors of the neighboring cities where Ahmed Paşa possessed property were ordered to be further searched. These orders, however, were inconclusive. (C.DH 152/7576 (17 August 1765 (20 Safer 1179)). In addition, it was not uncommon to see a potential victim of confiscation fleeing his hometown, presumably together with a lot of property that was light in weight but heavy in value. Documents that mention such people use the term “fugitive”. In many such cases, a local military administrator was asked to track and capture the fugitives. While the outcome of tracking process could be affirmative, many people seem to have managed to vanish without a trace. An illustration of such a case is İsmail Ağa of Antakya. Many local elites in the fiscal business were rivals. It is thus not surprising that İsmail Ağa killed Amanzade Mustafa Ağa following a conflict between the two families. The evidence from this case demonstrate that İsmail Ağa fled to Hedjaz after the homicide because he was scared of punishment that would include confiscation (AE.SABH.I 65/475-3 (6 September 1785 (2 Zilkade 1199)), AE. SABH.I 65/475-6. AESABH.I 66/4604-3 (25 March 1785 (14 Cemaziyülevvel 1199). Although we don’t know what he had taken with him, another instance from the history of the Çapanoğlu family shows that Mustafa, the son of above-mentioned Ahmed Paşa, fled to Crimea with some 45,000 piasters (around 5,625 lb) (AE.III.Mustafa 25565, C.ML 22924 (1766)). It is interesting that Caniklizade Ali, the head of Caniklizade family that was the “enemy” of the Çapanoğlu family, also fled to Crimea after his family lost the battle against their rivals (Karagöz 2003). His wealth was being confiscated while he was in Crimea.

  12. 12.

    These are honorific titles used by people of high rank or social status, indicating membership in the elite.

  13. 13.

    D.BŞM.MHF 13454, D.BŞM.MHF 13465.

  14. 14.

    The game in its extensive-form is presented in Annex 1.

  15. 15.

    We report results when A1 does not hold (\(r_{ - c} \ne 0\)) in Annex 2, it does not qualitatively change implications of our model.

  16. 16.

    The importance of linking coercive behavior of the Sultan to the level of taxation by a ‘Laffer curve’ is present in the work of Grafe and Irigoin (2013, p. 203).

  17. 17.

    There were mainly two military units in the Ottoman Empire. One of them was called Janissaries, most of which were based in the capital. They were paid salary as their (expectedly) only occupation was military service. The other unit of troops was Sipahis (cavalries). They were holders of a tax unit assigned by the sultan and was entitled to the income of it in return for military and administrative services. In addition to providing military protection for the territory under their protection, they were ordered to join the army at wartime with a requested number of soldiers. This military system called tımar was quite similar to those of the Muslim Empires of the Middle East. The main rationale behind the use of this system was the low levels of monetization. It was a viable solution under the constraint that the scarcity of precious metals that were extensively used in the Middle Ages was leading the states to pay centrally based military forces, and the peasants to pay taxes in cash (İnalcık 2001).

  18. 18.

    The second order condition (SOC) is verified: \(\frac{{\partial^{2} p}}{{\partial f^{2} }} = \frac{{\lambda^{\lambda } \lambda \left( {1 - \lambda } \right)^{1 - \lambda } \left( {\lambda - 1} \right)}}{{\lambda^{2} \left( {\lambda - 1} \right)^{2} }} \le 0\).

  19. 19.

    In some cases, the need for refunding the treasury or even affluence was used as a pretext by the government to confiscate. One of the interesting explanations for considering ‘affluence’ as a—justification for confiscation is as follows. When the confiscator was commissioned with the confiscation of the wealth of Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Mehmed, he was told that ‘because he has been the ayan [tax farmer] for a long while now, it is expected that he possesses so much wealth.’ C.DH 329/16413 (28 August 1792 (10 Muharrem 1207)). Quantifying the contribution of confiscation revenues to total state revenues is tricky because it is hard to find revenue data of good quality and to know the total number of confiscations in a given period. Arslantaş (2018) finds an approximate number, which is around 6.85 and 6.84%, for the years of 1784 and 1785 for which revenue data exist.

  20. 20.

    See, for example: C.ML 460/18682 (12 January 1793 (29 Cemaziyülevvel 1207)).

  21. 21.

    The SOC is verified: \(\frac{{\partial^{2} U_{i} }}{{\partial c_{i}^{ 2} }} = - \frac{{\left( {\lambda - 1} \right)^{2} \delta^{2} }}{s} \le 0\).

  22. 22.

    Based on (10), (11) and (12) one can easily notice that Definition 2 assumes that values of the parameters \(r_{c} ,\)\(\lambda\), \(s\), and \(\delta\) simultaneously verify: \(r_{c} \in \left( {\frac{\lambda }{1 - \lambda },2\delta } \right)\) and \(s \in \left( {\frac{{2\lambda \delta^{2} \left( {1 - \lambda } \right)}}{{r_{c}^{2} \left( {2 - \lambda } \right)}},\frac{{\delta^{2} \left( {1 - \lambda } \right)}}{{r_{c} }}} \right)\).

  23. 23.

    Many Sultans were dethroned during the history of the Empire. During the period 1603 and 1703 alone, dethronements put an end to the reign of six out of nine Sultans (Evrensel and Minx 2017). Selim III (r. 1789–1807) exemplifies the risk of pursuing policies against the interests of established groups. In order to finance his Western-style reforms particularly in the military, he followed a centrist policy including confiscation from elites. In the event known as the 1806 Edirne Incident, the New Order Troops (Selim’s newly founded army) confronted a coalition of Balkan elites whose lands were under the threat of confiscation. The fact that the Edirne incident ended in favor of the Balkan elites greatly shook the authority of Selim III (Shaw 1971). He was eventually deposed by the Janissaries who acted with a fatwa (religious verdict) from the Grand Mufti.

  24. 24.

    It should be noted that this situation cannot happen in an interior solution as defined in Definition 2. That is why Proposition 1 does not predict it.

  25. 25.

    An archival document dated to 1786 is quite telling in terms of symbiotic relationship between the Sultan and elites. Upon the allegations that Çapanoğlu Süleyman was oppressing the people under him, the Sultan asked the opinion of his Grand Vizier as how to proceed. While for many others, this could result in execution and confiscation, the first part of the response of the Vizier was as follows: “It cannot be said that what is being rumored about the Çapanoğlus is wrong. But at this time if there is a need of 5000 and 10,000 soldiers, we have only Çapanoğlus from the dynasties that can send. They were the ones who sent 1000 soldiers to Egypt and this time 2000 to the army of Ismail. If they are needed again, they would do the same.” The words of the vizier refer to a type of reciprocity based on the military support in exchange for non-confiscation. The second part of the vizier’s answer emphasizes the irreplaceability of the family’s know-how by a centrally appointed official: “If a Paşa is appointed to replace him, his influence will not be like that of the Çapanoğlu because of inexperience. That is because he knows the temperament of people. For now, we shall try to warn him by sending a letter.” The Sultan responded as follows: “My vizier, it is understood that his execution is not timely. There should be a more appropriate time for it.” (Uzunçarşılı 1974) (HAT 25642).

  26. 26.

    In analyses of economic relations between the sovereign and constituents, new institutional research has usually focused on merchants as victims of state predation and thus taxation as a source of credible retaliation, meaning that the ruler avoids confiscation if a potential target can provide revenue through tax higher than the gains from one-off confiscation (Veitch 1986; Olson 1993; Greif 2008). This does not explain the Ottoman case in which the majority of the targets of confiscation were exempt from tax payment. Shirking in tax collection was not the issue either as taxes were mostly collected under the tax farming system, requiring fiscal contractors to make a lump sum payment. Potential victims of müsadere could have three sources of bargaining power. In other words, three things could have deterred the sovereign from confiscation. First, some elites who were organized as patrimonial families had their own troops in which they had invested for decades. They could and did sometimes use their military power against the central government. Certainly, the center’s military power was always superior to theirs. But the fact that they possessed armed troops had a deterrence effect, especially when the opportunity cost of fighting a local trouble-maker was high. Second, many potential targets of confiscation had a symbiotic relationship with the imperial center, which required them to provision wars abroad by manning imperial armies or sending food and munition to warzones. Third, credibility of these threats depended also on the nature of fiscal markets in which they operated. As for provincial elites, some enjoyed monopolies, while some had to compete with others. A family, which was particularly successful in capturing monopoly rents over its territorial zone of influence, was unlikely to be replaced when its wealth and power was confiscated. By contrast, the relative bargaining power of those families that operated in competitive fiscal markets was lower since they could be easily replaced by others. For example, consider two families, i.e. the Karaosmanoğlus of Manisa in western Anatolia and the Çapanoğlus of Yozgat in central Anatolia. These families enjoyed monopoly power in their spheres of influences from the mid-18th to early 19th century. The more they monopolized, the more they became irreplaceable. Out of 21 (13 and 8 respectively) confiscation attempts initiated against these families, only 4 ended with full confiscation. In 16 cases (11 and 5) they managed to eschew full confiscation. In other words, when an elite had a monopoly over a market, he was able to negotiate with the Sultan to secure better economic positions (Arslantaş 2018).

  27. 27.

    The upper bound has been arbitrary chosen to ease the graphic representation. Other subcases exists but would have assumed returns on captive assets superior to 178% \(\left( {r_{c} > 1.78} \right)\). Consequently, Fig. 4 only covers \(r_{c} \in \left[ {0,0.7} \right]\).

  28. 28.

    We keep only one solution due to the fact that \(n_{h}^{*} \ge 0\) and \(\left( {\alpha_{0} (1 + s_{h} ) + \overline{n} } \right)^{2} + 3\left( {{\varGamma }\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right) - s_{h} \overline{n}^{2} } \right) - \left( {2\overline{n} - \alpha_{0} \left( {1 + s_{h} } \right)} \right)^{2} = - 3\left( {\overline{n}^{2} - {\varGamma } - 2\alpha_{0} \overline{n} } \right)\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right) \le 0\).

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Acknowledgments

We wholeheartedly thank our two anonymous referees, and the editor in chief, William Shughart II of the Public Choice journal, for their excellent and constructive comments. We also like to thank our discussant Riccardo Magnani for his insightful remarks as well as the participants of the international symposium on ‘Predatory State’ organized by CEPN at the University Paris 13 on May 20, 2019. We particularly benefited from the comments of Philippe Batifoulier, Nicolas Da Silva, Bertrand Crettez, Peter Leeson, Stergios Skaperdas, and Gert Tingaard Svendsen. Finally, we would also like to present our gratitude to Mandana Vahabi for her detailed remarks on earlier versions of this paper. All the remaining errors are ours.

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Appendix

Appendix

Annex 1: Game represented in extensive form

See Fig. 6.

Fig. 6
figure6

Extensive form of the müsadere game

Annex 2: Computational details

Positive returns on fugitive assets \(\varvec{r}_{{ - \varvec{c}}} > 0\)

We adopt the exact same methodology that we present in the paper. Our results are:

$$c_{i}^{*} = \frac{{\left( {r_{c} - r_{ - c} } \right)s}}{{\delta^{2} \left( {1 - \lambda } \right)}}$$
(18)

The analytical values for tax rate and müsadere that are solutions to the Sultan’s program in (7)

$$\left\{ {\frac{{\left[ {s\left( {r_{c} - r_{ - c} } \right)^{2} + 2\delta^{2} \left( {1 - \lambda } \right)\left( {1 + r_{ - c} } \right) } \right]\lambda }}{{r_{ - c} \delta^{2} \left( {1 - \lambda } \right) + s\left( {r_{c} - r_{ - c} } \right)^{2} }}, \frac{{\left( {r_{c} - r_{ - c} } \right)}}{2\delta }} \right\}$$
(19)

On the numerical application

All numerical values are approximated at \(10^{ - 2}\). According to (10), (11) and (12), we have: \(c_{i}^{*} = 7.41r_{c}\), \(n^{*} = 0.56r_{c}\), \(\tau^{*} = \frac{{0.33\left( {1.2r_{c}^{2} + 0.32} \right)}}{{r_{c}^{2} }}\) and \(\tau^{{*}^{r}} = 0.8 + 0.8r_{c}\). When values of parameters are superior or equal to 1, we systematically normalized them to 1 in order to avoid inconsistent situations e.g. the Sultan taxes more than 100% of the revenues of elite \(\left( {\tau > 1} \right)\). We can distinguish three cases for \(r_{c} \in \left[ {0,0.7} \right]\).Footnote 27 First, when \(r_{c} \in \left[ {0, 0.13} \right)\), \(\tau^{*} = \tau^{{*}^{r}} = 1, c_{i}^{*} < 1\) and \(n^{*} < 1\). We have \(\Delta W = 3.68r_{c} \left( {r_{c} - 0.27} \right)\) and \(\Delta T = 10.77r_{c} \left( {r_{c} - 0.09} \right).\) Second, when \(r_{c} \in \left[ {0.13,0.42} \right)\), \(\tau^{*} = \tau^{{*}^{r}} = c_{i}^{*} = 1\) and \(n^{*} < 1\). One can show that \(\Delta W = - 0.5r_{c}\) and \(\Delta T = - 0.38r_{c} \left( {r_{c} - 1.34} \right)\). Last, when \(r_{c} \in \left[ {0.42,0.7} \right]\), \(\tau^{{*}^{r}} = c_{i}^{*} = 1, \tau^{*} < 1\) and \(n^{*} < 1\). Therefore, \(\Delta W = - 0.5r_{c}\) and \(\Delta T = \frac{{ - 0.38r_{c} \left( {r_{c} - 0.58} \right)\left( {rc^{2} + 0.84r_{c} + 0.49} \right)}}{{r_{c} }}\).

Proof of Proposition 2.b.

FOC of the problem in (16) is given by:

$$\frac{{\partial {\text{T}}_{\text{s}} }}{{\partial n_{h} }} = {\varGamma } - s_{h} \left( {n_{h} } \right)^{2} - \left( {\overline{n} - n_{h} } \right)^{2} + \left( {n_{h} + \alpha_{0} } \right)\left( {2\overline{n} - 2n_{h} \left( {1 + s_{h} } \right)} \right) = 0$$
(20)

Let \(n_{h}^{*}\) be the value of \(n_{h}\) verifying (A3), we haveFootnote 28:

$$n_{h}^{*} = \frac{1}{{3\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right)}}\left[ {2\overline{n} - \alpha_{0} \left( {1 + s_{h} } \right) + \sqrt {\left( {\alpha_{0} (1 + s_{h} ) + \overline{n} } \right)^{2} + 3\left( {{\varGamma }\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right) - s_{h} \overline{n}^{2} } \right)} } \right]$$
(21)

We need to ensure that \(\left( {\alpha_{0} (1 + s_{h} ) + \overline{n} } \right)^{2} + 3\left( {{\varGamma }\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right) - s_{h} \overline{n}^{2} } \right) \ge 0\). It is always verified if \(s_{h} \left( {{\varGamma } - \overline{n}^{2} } \right) \ge 0\) which holds by definition because we only consider the case \(T \ge 0\).

Considering \(\alpha_{h}\) as a proxy of the fiscal capacity of the Sultan, we prove the Proposition 2.b. by showing that \(\partial n_{h}^{*} /\partial \alpha_{0} \ge 0\). To ease tractability, let \(\lambda = \left( {\alpha_{0} (1 + s_{h} ) + \overline{n} } \right)^{2} + 3\left( {{\varGamma }\left( {s_{h} + 1} \right) - s_{h} \overline{n}^{2} } \right) \ge 0\), then

$$\frac{{\partial n_{h}^{*} }}{{\partial \alpha_{0} }} = \frac{1}{3\sqrt \lambda }\left( {\alpha_{0} s_{h} + \alpha_{0} + \overline{n} - \sqrt \lambda } \right)$$

We have \(\lambda - \left( {\alpha_{0} s_{h} + \alpha_{0} + \overline{n} } \right)^{2} = 3\left( {s_{h} \left( {{\varGamma } - \overline{n}^{2} } \right) + {\varGamma }} \right) \ge 0\), therefore \(\frac{{\partial n_{h}^{*} }}{{\partial \alpha_{0} }} \le 0\). In other words, the lower the fiscal capacity (\(\alpha_{0}\)) of the Sultan is, the more h-type elites are targeted.

Annex 3: Archival Sources

Note: All archival documents used in this paper were purchased from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. The following abbreviations refer to the name of the catalogue they are located, while the number part shows the exact location of the document in a given catalogue.

Abbreviations:

AE.III.Mustafa: Ali Emiri 3. Mustafa

AE.SABH.I: Ali Emiri 1. Abdülhamid

C.DH: Cevdet Dahiliye

C.ML: Cevdet Maliye

D.BŞM.MHF.d: Başmuhasebe Muhallefat Defterleri

Sources of Quantitative Analysis:

Ali Emiri Sultan Abdulhamid I

304/20407

Ali Emiri Sultan Mustafa III

26/1797, 193/15240

Ali Emiri Sultan Selim III

5/244, 70/4188, 144/8720, 174/10429, 189/11380, 221/12949, 269/15545, 357/20462, 361/20660, 410/23604

Başmuhasebe Kalemi Muhallefat Halifeliği Defterleri (D.BŞM.MHF.d...)

5618, 12442, 12456, 12571, 12585, 12586, 12587, 12590, 12591, 12592, 12593, 12594, 12597, 12603, 12606, 12609, 12612, 12617, 12618, 12619, 12620, 12629, 12634, 12635, 12636, 12637, 12639, 12640, 12652, 12653, 12654, 12656, 12657, 12659, 12660, 12662, 12663, 12664, 12666, 12668, 12669, 12670, 12671, 12673, 12674, 12675, 12676, 12677, 12678, 12679, 12680, 12681, 12682, 12683, 12684, 12685, 12686, 12690, 12691, 12694, 12695, 12696, 12697, 12698, 12699, 12701, 12702, 12703, 12704, 12705, 12706, 12708, 12710, 12711, 12712, 12713, 12714, 12717, 12719, 12720, 12721, 12722, 12723, 12725, 12726, 12727, 12728, 12730, 12731, 12732, 12733, 12734, 12735, 12736, 12739, 12746, 12748, 12749, 12750, 12752, 12754, 12756, 12757, 12758, 12759, 12761, 12763, 12766, 12769, 12771, 12772, 12774, 12775, 12777, 12778, 12779, 12781, 12782, 12784, 12785, 12786, 12788, 12789, 12790, 12793, 12794, 12796, 12797, 12799, 12800, 12801, 12802, 12803, 12805, 12806, 12807, 12808, 12809, 12810, 12812, 12813, 12814, 12815, 12816, 12817, 12818, 12819, 12822, 12823, 12826, 12828, 12829, 12830, 12831, 12832, 12836, 12837, 12838, 12839, 12840, 12841, 12842, 12843, 12844, 12846, 12847, 12848, 12849, 12852, 12853, 12854, 12855, 12856, 12858, 12859, 12860, 12861, 12862, 12863, 12864, 12865, 12866, 12867, 12868, 12869, 12870, 12872, 12873, 12876, 12878, 12882, 12883, 12884, 12885, 12886, 12887, 12888, 12889, 12890, 12892, 12894, 12895, 12896, 12898, 12899, 12900, 12901, 12902, 12906, 12907, 12908, 12909, 12910, 12912, 12913, 12914, 12915, 12917, 12918, 12919, 12920, 12921, 12922, 12923, 12924, 12925, 12926, 12928, 12929, 12930, 12931, 12932, 12934, 12936, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12940, 12941, 12942, 12943, 12945, 12946, 12948, 12949, 12950, 12952, 12955, 12956, 12957, 12958, 12960, 12961, 12962, 12963, 12964, 12966, 12967, 12968, 12969, 12970, 12972, 12975, 12979, 12980, 12981, 12982, 12983, 12984, 12985, 12986, 12988, 12989, 12990, 12992, 12993, 12995, 12996, 12997, 12998, 12999, 13001, 13002, 13003, 13004, 13005, 13006, 13007, 13008, 13009, 13010, 13011, 13012, 13013, 13014, 13015, 13016, 13017, 13018, 13020, 13022, 13023, 13024, 13025, 13027, 13028, 13029, 13030, 13031, 13034, 13035, 13036, 13037, 13038, 13039, 13040, 13044, 13046, 13047, 13048, 13049, 13050, 13051, 13052, 13053, 13055, 13056, 13057, 13059, 13060, 13061, 13062, 13063, 13064, 13068, 13069, 13070, 13071, 13072, 13074, 13075, 13076, 13077, 13079, 13081, 13082, 13084, 13085, 13086, 13087, 13088, 13089, 13090, 13091, 13092, 13093, 13094, 13095, 13097, 13098, 13099, 13100, 13101, 13102, 13103, 13107, 13110, 13111, 13112, 13114, 13115, 13116, 13117, 13119, 13120, 13121, 13122, 13123, 13125, 13126, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134, 13135, 13136, 13137, 13140, 13141, 13142, 13143, 13144, 13145, 13151, 13152, 13153, 13155, 13156, 13158, 13159, 13160, 13161, 13162, 13163, 13164, 13165, 13166, 13167, 13168, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174, 13175, 13176, 13177, 13179, 13180, 13181, 13182, 13183, 13185, 13186, 13187, 13188, 13190, 13191, 13192, 13193, 13194, 13195, 13196, 13197, 13198, 13199, 13200, 13202, 13203, 13204, 13205, 13206, 13207, 13208, 13209, 13210, 13211, 13215, 13216, 13217, 13218, 13220, 13221, 13222, 13223, 13224, 13225, 13226, 13227, 13228,13229, 13231, 13232, 13234, 13235, 13236, 13237, 13238, 13239, 13240, 13241, 13244, 13246, 13247, 13248, 13251, 13252, 13253, 13254, 13255, 13256, 13257, 13258, 13259, 13260, 13261, 13262, 13263, 13264, 13265, 13267, 13268, 13269, 13271, 13273, 13275, 13277, 13278, 13279, 13281, 13282, 13283, 13284, 13285, 13286, 13289, 13290, 13291, 13292, 13293, 13294, 13295, 13296, 13297, 13298, 13299, 13300, 13301, 13302, 13303, 13304, 13305, 13306, 13307, 13308, 13309, 13310, 13311, 13312, 13313, 13314, 13317, 13318, 13319, 13320, 13321, 13323, 13324,13325, 13326, 13327, 13329, 13330, 13331, 13332, 13336, 13337, 13339, 13340, 13341, 13342, 13343, 13345, 13347, 13348, 13349, 13350, 13351, 13359, 13360, 13361, 13362, 13363, 13365, 13366, 13367, 13368, 13369, 13370, 13371, 13372, 13373, 13374, 13375, 13379, 13380,13381, 13382, 13383, 13384, 13385, 13386, 13387, 13389, 13390, 13392, 13393, 13395, 13398, 13399, 13403, 13405, 13412, 13423, 13429, 13432, 13436, 13437, 13440, 13443, 13444, 13445, 13446, 13448, 13451, 13452, 13454, 13455, 13463, 13464, 13465, 13466, 13467, 13469, 13470, 13472, 13473, 13474, 13476, 13477, 13490, 13492, 13493, 13496, 13497, 13500, 13511, 13512, 13515, 13518, 13525, 13526, 13527, 13528, 13529, 13530, 13532, 13533, 13536, 13537, 13538, 13540, 13541, 13543, 13544, 13545, 13546, 13547, 13548, 13552, 13553, 13555, 13557, 13561, 13562, 13563, 13564, 13565, 13566, 13569, 13572, 13575, 13576, 13577, 13579, 13580, 13582, 13583, 13586, 13587, 13594, 13599, 13601, 13604, 13605, 13607,13608,13610, 13611, 13612, 13613, 13614,13616,13617,13619,13620, 13621, 13622, 13623, 13626, 13627, 13628, 13629, 13631, 13633, 13634, 13635, 13636, 13637, 13639, 13664, 13665, 13666, 13667, 13668, 13669, 13670, 13671, 13672,13673, 13674, 13675, 13676, 13677, 13678, 13680, 13681,13682, 13683, 13684, 13685, 13686, 13687, 13688, 13689, 13690, 13692, 13694, 13695, 13696, 13697, 13701, 13702, 13703, 13704, 13708, 13710, 13711, 13712, 13713, 13714, 13715, 13716, 13717, 13718, 13719, 13720, 13721,13722,13723,13724, 13725,13726, 41354

Başmuhasebe Kalemi Zimmet Halifeliği

13937

Büyük Ruznamçe Kalemi Sergi Halifeliği

21300, 21303

Cevdet Adliye

9/566, 61/3687, 84/5073, 101/6095, 104/6253, 105/6277, 25/1512, 45/2751, 54/3288, 55/3327, 60/3628, 61/3673, 62/3729, 62/3730, 63/3754, 93/5603, 93/5604, 95/5687, 703/28713

Cevdet Askeriye

1041/45716

Cevdet Dahiliye

2/83, 142/7090, 156/7795, 159/7901, 175/8713, 177/8815, 182/9098, 188/9381, 217/10808

Cevdet Maliye

42/1942, 69/4129, 70/3229, 82/4979, 95/4268, 95/4269, 95/4270, 105/4660, 144/6093, 167/7001, 189/7845, 227/9489, 243/10117, 243/10130, 255/10503, 269/11038, 317/13048, 326/13431, 336/13768, 336/13774, 339/13926, 357/14626, 358/14690, 369/15158, 373/15355, 374/15389, 375/15406, 376/15449, 389/15918, 395/16165, 427/17283, 428/17301, 445/17993, 448/18138, 451/18257, 481/19623, 481/19624, 489/19929, 492/20005, 504/20468, 504/20496, 505/20550, 558/22906, 576/23646, 578/23731, 583/23998, 613/25271, 624/25689, 650/26610, 662/27099, 703/28713, 714/29165, 719/29421, 735/30007, 748/30460, 749/30520, 759/30930, 30930, 762/31051, 769/31398, 774/31578, 776/31697, 777/31744, 780/31846, 784/31951

Darphane-i Amire

692/1245, 9/427, 693, 1246

Hattı Humayunlar

105/4117C

Kamil Kepeci Defterleri

2397, 2448, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2455, 2456, 2459, 2460, 2462, 2463, 3294, 3295, 3296, 3297, 753

Sources of Qualitative Analysis:

AE.III.Mustafa 25565

AE.SABH.I 65/475-3

AE. SABH.I 65/475-6

AE.SABH.I 66/4604-3

C.DH 152/7576

C.DH 329/16413

C.ML 460/18682

C.ML 22924 (1766)

D.BŞM.MHF.d 13289

D.BŞM.MHF.d 13327

D.BŞM.MHF.d 13341

D.BŞM.MHF.d 13454

D.BŞM.MHF 13465.

D.BŞM.MHF.d 13465.

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Arslantaş, Y., Pietri, A. & Vahabi, M. State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839. Public Choice 182, 417–442 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00700-9

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Keywords

  • Captive and fugitive assets
  • Confiscations
  • Fiscal System
  • Müsadere
  • Ottoman Empire
  • Political Laffer curve
  • Predation

JEL Classification

  • D74
  • H22
  • N45