Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities

  • Roger D. CongletonEmail author


A variety of complementarities and overlaps exist between the psychological strand of behavioral economics and the subjectivist strand of Virginia Political Economy. This paper provides an overview of those commonalities and places them in a common information processing framework. The framework can account for systematic mistakes, framing effects, subjectivity, individual variety, and several issues in constitutional political economy. It also reveals many commonalities between these two quite different approaches to human behavior.


Behavioral economics Public choice Virginia School Natural ignorance Rule-bound choice Framing effects Human variety Information collection and processing 

JEL Classification

B1 B4 D60 D6 D7 D8 D9 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.West Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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