Abstract
When do persecuted ethnic minority groups choose to assimilate into the dominant majority group, rather than differentiate from it, and how do states respond? We argue that any answer to these questions must consider the joint effects of identity on state repression and the possibility of ethnic conflict. We posit two mechanisms through which identity acts: (1) mobilization and (2) operational capacity, defined as the ability of the group to contest state repression successfully. We show that minority groups may choose assimilation, even when differentiation would aid them in mobilization against the state, for a tactical reason: the benefits from improved mobilization may be outweighed by costly reductions in operational capacity. Efforts to assimilate emerge when the state cannot be indiscriminate in countering dissent, or when members of the minority group can more easily pass as members of the majority. Repressive states, in anticipation, will hinder assimilation by accentuating fundamental differences between groups.
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Notes
Sambanis and Shayo (2013) allow for the endogeneity of conflict and identification choices but do not incorporate the role of state repression. Identity choice in our model is also more instrumental than in theirs. Caselli and Coleman (2013) and Eguia (2013) allow for the endogeneity of repression and identification, but not the decision of the minority group to engage in operations against the state. Mele and Siegel (2017) incorporate endogenous identity choice, repression, and ethnic conflict, but consider only strong states under which mobilization is disadvantaged, and do not consider the state’s decision to hinder or facilitate the group’s choice of identifiability. In a two-period model in which the group that controls the state is determined endogenously, Bhattacharya et al. (2015) endogenize identity, repression (through expropriation), and conflict. In their model, members of the out-group may switch to the in-group following the first period’s conflict decision; switching has an exogenous cost, increases present economic gains, and reduces the chance of coming successfully to power next period. Dasgupta (2017) considers identity choice in the context of social conflict over public space, conflict that can be influenced by political contributions.
The assumption serves as a scope condition for the model and keeps the focus on instrumental identity choice, rather than merely on identity choice arising from aligned preferences.
A straightforward extension of the model would assign different values of \(\delta\) to assimilation and differentiation, but that would not alter any results for reasons discussed in the supplemental appendix.
We chose relatively simple utility functions to keep our focus on the success function, p, and related key concepts described further in the next section. However, an interesting extension of the model would relax our assumptions on utility to allow nonlinear or even endogenous valuations of repression on the part of both G and R (see e.g., Dasgupta and Neogi 2018). For example, G’s marginal utility of repression might decline as R assimilates.
Ours is a one-shot model, and does not capture temporal variation in the difficulty of taking a given action in order to assimilate.
We can weaken that conclusion slightly and maintain our assumption as long as the net effect of all identifiability shifts among minority group members in terms of mobilization and operational capacity is in the direction spurred by group leaders. That will occur when the leader successfully spurs those members most important for mobilization and operations. Although we adopt the unitary actor assumption in order to focus on the interplay of identity choice, repression, and conflict, our analysis is consistent with reasonable assumptions about individual preferences or information access, as in Sambanis and Shayo (2013) and Bueno De Mesquita (2010). It also helps identify the conditions under which an activated (nominal) group may become deactivated (activated) (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008).
A common factor produced by factor analysis is an empirical analogue to identifiability here. Note that we are not saying that that factor encompasses all aspects of identifiability. Rather, we are saying that it encompasses parts of identifiability common to external and internal identifiability. Also note that, though we assume formally that the state hinders changes in the common factor of identifiability directly when it so chooses, our logic underlying state action is consistent with the third assumption. Attempts to hinder assimilation may focus, as in our examples, on increasing external identifiability. But such attempts also deliberately make it more difficult for members of the minority group to keep salient other aspects of their identity, likely increasing internal identifiability as well. Similarly, attempts to hinder differentiation, as in our examples, may focus on reducing internal identifiability. But such attempts also deliberately make it more difficult, or at least less beneficial, for members of the minority group to exploit open signals of group membership, likely reducing external identifiability as well.
Note that identifiability does not serve as a signal in our model, as it does in Austen et al. (2005).
Our assumption on internal identifiability is common; see Sambanis and Shayo (2013) for a discussion and Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) for the empirical relationship of this concept to measures of polarization. Research on social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979) generally supports increased attention to in-group members and separation from out-group “others”; see also Hale (2008) and Harris and Findley (2014). Mobilization strategies taking advantage of increased attention to in-group members and separation from out-group “others” are also common: Steve Biko’s black consciousness movement in South Africa during apartheid is but one example. Note that the existence of a benefit to greater internal identifiability does not preclude fragmentation within ethnic groups, which can occur due to unmodeled factors such as the distribution of power among co-ethnic factions, their organizational makeup (Bakke et al. 2012), or competition between them (McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Lawrence 2010; Cunningham 2011, 2013; Cunningham et al. 2012). Though our model does speak to variation across ethnic group factions related to different levels of identifiability or ease of mobilization, we do not consider differential repression across factions.
Mele and Siegel (2017) find that minority groups have strong incentives to assimilate under these conditions, and typically do so. However, given sufficient pressure from further repression, they may instead differentiate in order to be less of a threat to the state, and so induce less additional repression. Neither incentive operates in our analysis.
If the positive direct effect of internal identifiability dominates instead, then \(\frac{\partial p}{\partial \sigma }>0\) and \(\frac{d p}{d \sigma }>0\) is always true. In that case, greater identifiability always leads to greater operational capacity. That result is subsumed under case B.
We also might have focused on a different tactical consideration highlighted by our model: minority group reliance on mobilization in anti-state operations, which is related to the \(\frac{\partial p}{\partial m}\) term. Groups rely more on mobilization when they have access to supportive populations, the state chooses not to or is not able to prohibit those populations from acting, and the state is responsive to mobilization. While this is an equally valid tactical concern, we keep our focus tighter out of a desire for clarity.
We assume that the government is interested primarily in reducing such harm, rather than harm to members of the minority group, who we assume will not be government supporters in any case. One likewise might consider a lack of discrimination with respect to different factions of the minority group, as does the literature on repression. Such indifference might lead to stronger grievances and higher levels of mobilization. However, because that consideration is unrelated to identity differences between the majority and minority groups, it is outside the scope of our model.
The result also indicates that some other models of identifiability, e.g., Caselli and Coleman (2013), might overestimate the likelihood of conflict by not taking operational capacity into account.
If the minority group were instead to experience increasing returns to repression, then increasing initial repression would always reduce the chances that the government would increase repression further in equilibrium, though that response would affect no other results.
As we show in the supplemental appendix, while it is possible to flip the comparative statics for \(\sigma _0\) in both cases, violating the assumption on \(\frac{\partial ^2 p}{\partial \sigma \partial \phi _i}\) is on its own insufficient to do so.
As discussed in the supplemental appendix, conditions exist under which the conclusion of Proposition 3 would reverse. First, repression would need to rise (fall) in identifiability in case A (B), as discussed in footnote 17. Second, managing the state’s choice of repression must be the dominant incentive underlying the minority group’s action. In other words, differentiation (assimilation) in case A (B) would occur if (1) Proposition 2 failed to hold and (2) seeking out (avoiding) the resulting fall (rise) in the likelihood of repression was a more important driver of identifiability choice than the decline in operational capacity that choice would cause.
Though we frame our discussion in terms of a dichotomy focusing on discrimination in counter-dissent or the lack thereof, we do so mostly for presentational purposes. The only true dichotomy in our model relates to the value of the first derivative of operational success with respect to identifiability. Just because the British could behave more indiscriminately in homogeneous wards, for example, does not imply that discrimination was not employed there. It merely implies that the difference in the need for a particular tactical response by the state would have had strategic implications working to produce more violence in homogeneous wards as identifiability increased.
Many more examples of such symbols can be found. For example, in response to the barricade, the residents of Derry proudly painted the slogan “You Are Now Entering Free Derry” on a gable wall in St. Columb’s Street (Jarman 1998). And the Belfast City Council sponsored a Community Arts scheme that provided for the production of 40 murals in working class districts between 1977 and 1981 (Sluka 2002).
As discussed in footnote 8, the government would face a similar difficulty if it were to attempt to hinder undesired changes in both types of identifiability simultaneously. We assume instead that it hinders changes to the common factor of identifiability, which reduces equilibrium changes in both types of identifiability in the same direction. That assumption does not lead to a trade-off for the government, nor does it obviate the trade-offs experienced by the minority group.
This effect plausibly interacts with the level of government discrimination. A government that has no need to discriminate may not take advantage of increases in external identifiability, minimizing the cost of differentiation to a group that may easily pass. A government that needs to discriminate but lacks the capacity might find its capacity enhanced by increased identifiability to the point that discrimination becomes an option, leading differentiation to be even more costly for the group. We keep the two considerations separate in our analysis only out of a desire for clarity.
More generally, when internal and external identifiability are not substantially correlated, and the former is more malleable than the latter, we expect to be in case B. When the latter is more malleable than the former, we expect to be in case A.
Schneider and Susser (2003, p. 256), for example, note that the murals to which we referred above are “more about talking to their own community; indeed most wall murals are not painted at the boundary edges but within housing estates”.
Note that even given clear racial or ethnic divides between majority and minority group, changes in external identifiability are still possible and still correlate with internal identifiability. For example, one could adopt overt mannerisms to appear as a government sympathizer, which would reduce both forms of identifiability.
Although the majority group actually was a numerical minority there, the argument still holds.
Many possible reasons can be found, e.g., corrosive racism or bounded rationality. Or, the regime could have believed it was strong in the sense of Mele and Siegel (2017), in which case it might have expected assimilation and behaved optimally given that expectation. Assimilation might have entailed reducing the salience of racial identity differences, while increasing the salience of a common nationalist identity.
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We thank Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Eric Dickson, Margaret Foster, So Jin Lee, Howard Liu, Will Moore, John Patty, Jake Shapiro, Mark Souva, and Katie Webster, audiences at Florida State, Penn State, SPSA, MPSA, APSA, WPSA, the Duke SPC lab, and the Triangle IR faculty group, and multiple reviewers for helpful and insightful comments. Any errors remain our own.
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Mele, C.S., Siegel, D.A. Identifiability, state repression, and the onset of ethnic conflict. Public Choice 181, 399–422 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00664-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00664-w