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Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”

  • Michael C. Munger
Article

Abstract

Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap.”

Keywords

History of economic thought Rent-seeking Corruption Economic development 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Paper prepared for special issue of Public Choice “Commemorating The 50th Anniversary of Gordon Tullock’s ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.’” Credit for suggestions, but no blame for shortcomings, goes to William Keech, Matthew Mitchell, David Schmidtz and David Skarbek.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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