Public Choice

, Volume 174, Issue 3–4, pp 239–256 | Cite as

Politics, entertainment and business: a multisided model of media

  • Alejandro Castañeda
  • César MartinelliEmail author


We offer a model of media as a multisided platform, providing entertainment and news to viewers, commercial opportunities to advertisers, and political influence to politicians, thanks to the presence of influenceable voters among the media audience. We characterize a political economic equilibrium, determining simultaneously media choices and politicians’ electoral positions. We show that as the value of political influence increases, the media transitions from catering to commercial advertisers to selling political influence, resulting in policy choices that hurt influenceable voters.


Media effects Three-sided platform Mass media 



We thank David Levine, Tom Palfrey, Andrea Mattozzi, Stephane Wolton, two anonymous referees, and several seminar audiences for comments and suggestions.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centro de Estudios EconómicosColegio de MéxicoMexico CityMexico
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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