## Abstract

We present a geometric representation of the method of run-off voting. With this representation we can observe the non-monotonicity of the method and its susceptibility to the no-show paradox. The geometry allows us easily to identify a novel compromise rule between run-off voting and plurality voting that is monotonic.

### Keywords

Geometry Voting Monotonicity Election triangle## Notes

### Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to Nick Miller, Ashley Piggins, Bill Zwicker and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions.

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