Geometry of run-off elections
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We present a geometric representation of the method of run-off voting. With this representation we can observe the non-monotonicity of the method and its susceptibility to the no-show paradox. The geometry allows us easily to identify a novel compromise rule between run-off voting and plurality voting that is monotonic.
KeywordsGeometry Voting Monotonicity Election triangle
I am extremely grateful to Nick Miller, Ashley Piggins, Bill Zwicker and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions.
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