Public Choice

, Volume 173, Issue 3–4, pp 267–288 | Cite as

Geometry of run-off elections

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Abstract

We present a geometric representation of the method of run-off voting. With this representation we can observe the non-monotonicity of the method and its susceptibility to the no-show paradox. The geometry allows us easily to identify a novel compromise rule between run-off voting and plurality voting that is monotonic.

Keywords

Geometry Voting Monotonicity Election triangle 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to Nick Miller, Ashley Piggins, Bill Zwicker and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics and the Whitaker InstituteNational University of Ireland GalwayGalwayIreland

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