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Table 4 Relatives abroad, remittances, and bribery experience: IV probit results

From: Does emigration reduce corruption?

  Contacted public official Contacted public official Paid a bribe Paid a bribe Was asked for bribe Was asked for bribe
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relatives abroad, no remittances 0.401
(2.274)
−1.409**
(0.632)
−1.763***
(0.481)
Remittances 0.677
(2.372)
−1.686**
(0.744)
−0.655
(1.911)
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country/region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy (2011) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument (Network-growth interaction)
 First-stage coefficient 0.643*** 0.700*** 0.713*** 0.829*** 0.643*** 0.700***
 F test of excluded instrument 16.68 16.20 20.91 24.00 16.68 16.20
Observations 10,788 9621 7803 6871 10,788 9621
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  1. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses. Only respondents who had a contact with public officials are included in specifications 3 and 4. See Supplementary Information for complete econometric output