This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
This analysis is performed using a software package that analyzes verbatim FOMC transcripts from 1977 to 2008, measuring “systematically (and statistically) the characteristic words, phrases, and in some cases, the dimensionality of the discourse of committee members” (p. 6). The software is described in detail in Appendix I of the book.
While both House and Senate hold hearings on the conduct of monetary policy, only the Senate committee makes a substantial decision, namely overseeing appointments to the Fed’s Board of Governors.
I am indebted to Peter Boettke for pointing out the differences between motivation and incentives.
Obviously there is feedback between decisions and institutions, especially informal institutions, in the FOMC and Congress. This does not diminish the usefulness of the two-stage approach.
References
Boettke, P. J., & Smith, D. J. (2013a). A century of influence: An anecdotal history of compromised Federal Reserve independence. GMU Working Paper in Economics, No. 12–40.
Boettke, P. J., & Smith, D. J. (2013b). Federal Reserve independence: A centennial review. The Journal of Prices & Markets, 1(1), 31–48.
Boettke, P. J., & Smith, D. J. (2013c). Monetary policy and the Nobel quest for robust political economy. Working paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Salter, A.W. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, deliberating American monetary policy: a textual analysis. Public Choice 160, 283–286 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0157-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0157-3