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Public Choice

, Volume 152, Issue 3–4, pp 345–349 | Cite as

The Calculus of Consent at fifty: the development of public choice in Japan

  • Akira YokoyamaEmail author
Article
  • 156 Downloads

Introduction

The 50th anniversary of the publication of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) provides an opportunity to reflect on the development of public choice theory in Japan. Large budget deficits and the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station serve as a reminder that the phenomenon of government failure, which the public choice literature has emphasized, is relevant for Japan. Can Japanese public choice scholars contribute to achieving constitutional changes that address such government failures through reform of the political decision-making process? In this essay, I sketch the development of public choice in Japan from the publication of The Calculusof Consent, and consider the prospect of public choice scholars contributing to constitutional changes in Japan.

The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines both my personal introduction to The Calculusof Consentand the expansion of the Japanese public choice school founded by...

Keywords

Public Choice Risk Preference Constitutional Rule Government Failure Public Choice Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Policy StudiesChuo UniversityTokyoJapan

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