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From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem

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Correspondence to Peter Bernholz.

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Bernholz, P. From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem. Public Choice 152, 265–271 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9966-4

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