It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations
- 333 Downloads
We investigate the possible explanations for variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish labor movement and socialist parties taking place in Copenhagen in the period 1980–2011. The most important explanatory variables are variations in the weather conditions and consumer confidence, while political and socio-economic conditions exhibit no robust effects. As such accidental or non-political factors may be much more important for collective political action than usually acknowledged and possibly make changes in aggregate levels of political support seem erratic and unpredictable.
KeywordsCollective action Demonstrations Free-riding
An earlier version of the present article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, 12th–14th March 2010. I owe thanks to my former research assistants Sebastian Gibson and Henrik Dahl Rasmussen, to Christian Bjørnskov, Catherine Hafer, Kasper M. Hansen, Jacob G. Hariri, Pete Leeson, Peter Nedergaard, Bill Shughart, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions, to the Copenhagen Police Department for assistance with data on numbers of demonstrators, and to John Cappelen and the Danish Meteorological Institute for access to historical weather data.
- DeNardo, J. (1985). Powers in numbers: the political strategy of protest and rebellion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar
- Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Collins. Google Scholar
- Gomez, B. T., Hansford, T. G., & Krause, G. A. (2007). The Republicans should pray for rain: weather, turnout, and voting in US Presidential elections. Journal of Politics, 69(3), 649–663. Google Scholar
- Kuran, T. (1991). The East European revolution of 1989: is it surprising that we were surprised? American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 81(2), 121–125. Google Scholar
- Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: the social consequences of preference falsification. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (1997). Rational choice, collective action and the paradox of rebellion. Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen & Copenhagen Political Studies Press. Google Scholar
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2004). The paradox of rebellion. In C. K. Rowley & F. Schneider (Eds.), The encyclopedia of public choice (Vol. 2, pp. 403–406). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Google Scholar
- Lichbach, M. I. (1995). The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar
- LO (2006). 1. maj—derfor. København: Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO). http://www.ugebreveta4.dk/~/media/LO/Fokus/1maj2009/1majderfor2006pdf.ashx.
- Olson, M. ( 1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1974). The social dilemma: the economics of war and revolution. Blacksburg: Center for Study of Public Choice. Google Scholar
- Wilke (2009). Arbejdernes internationale kampdag lever endnu. Wilke Nyhedsbrev (maj). Google Scholar