Abstract
We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Barbera, S., Maschler, M., & Shalev, J. (2001). Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 40–78.
Becker, G. S. (1974). A theory of marriage: Part II. Journal of Political Economy, 82, S11–S26.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32, 1–14.
Cai, H., & Feng, H. (2007). A theory of organizational dynamics: internal politics and efficiency (SSRN Working Paper).
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Couch, J. F., Shughart, W. F. II, & Williams, A. L. (1993). Private school enrollment and public school performance. Public Choice, 76, 301–312.
Damiano, E., Li, H., & Suen, W. (2010). First in village or second in Rome? International Economic Review, 51, 263–288.
Ellickson, B., Grodal, B., Scotchmer, S., & Zame, W. R. (1999). Clubs and the market. Econometrica, 67, 1185–1217.
Epple, D., & Romano, R. (1998). Competition between private schools, vouchers, and peer-group effects. American Economic Review, 62, 33–62.
Epple, D., & Romano, R. (2008). Educational vouchers and cream skimming. International Economic Review, 49, 1395–1435.
Hansmann, H. (1986). A theory of status organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2, 119–130.
Helsley, R. W., & Strange, W. C. (1991). Exclusion and the theory of clubs. Canadian Journal of Economics, 24, 888–899.
Hoxby, C. M. (1996). Are efficiency and equity in school finance substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 51–72.
Kremer, M. (1993). The O-ring theory of economic development. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 551–575.
Legros, P., & Newman, A. F. (2007). Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince: assortative matching with nontransferabilities. Econometrica, 75, 1073–1102.
Masten, S. E. (1995). Old school ties: financial aid coordination and the governance of higher education. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28, 23–47.
Masten, S. E. (2006). Authority and commitment: why universities, like legislatures, are not organized as firms. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15, 649–684.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. (1980). The economic theory of clubs: an evaluative survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 18, 1481–1521.
Sobel, J. (2001). On the dynamics of standards. RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 606–623.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
About this article
Cite this article
Prüfer, J., Walz, U. Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions. Public Choice 155, 507–529 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9885-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9885-9