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Public Choice

, Volume 152, Issue 1–2, pp 163–180 | Cite as

Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk

  • David M. LevyEmail author
  • Sandra J. Peart
Article

Abstract

Gordon Tullock denied scientific status to economics because economists can trade results with the subject of our analysis. We suppose this trading to be the fate of all disciplines in which the results have consequences for well-being of those studied. Non-transparent trading in a statistical context gives no reason to believe that the sampling distribution of the estimates will be what it is believed to be. This false belief turns risk to uncertainty. Taking trading between experts and subjects as inevitable, we ask if the trade is fair. When scientific unanimity fails, can Rawlsian unanimity replace it?

Keywords

Gordon Tullock Michael Polanyi Truth seeking Scientific faction Analytical egalitarianism 

JEL Classification

B31 B41 D78 D82 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Study of Public ChoiceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.Jepson School of Leadership StudiesUniversity of RichmondRichmondUSA

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