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Public Choice

, Volume 154, Issue 3–4, pp 285–313 | Cite as

The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability

  • Eoin F. McGuirk
Article

Abstract

This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which natural resources can affect democracy. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is corroborated using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents. Results are robust to a range of alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections.

Keywords

Democracy Political economy Natural resources Curses Africa 

JEL Classification

D73 O13 O55 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS)Trinity College DublinDublin 2Ireland

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