Abstract
The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why (a) senior members, and junior members in safe seats, are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; (b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point for jurisdictional gains; (c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adler, E. Scott, & Still, Dennis (2000). Redefining committee jurisdictions: a bill referral approach. In Midwest political science association annual meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2000.
Balla, Steven (2000). Legislative organization and congressional review of agency regulations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(2), 424–448.
Baron, David P. (2000). eBay and database protection. Stanford Business School, Case S-P-33.
Baumgartner, Frank R., & Jones, Bryan D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baumgartner, Frank B., Jones, Bryan D., & MacLeod, Michael C. (2000). The evolution of legislative jurisdictions. Journal of Politics, 62, 321–349.
Bimber, Bruce (1996). The politics of expertise in congress. Albany: State University Press of New York.
de Figueiredo, John M. (2011). Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes (Working paper #17171). National Bureau of Economic Research.
de Figueiredo, John M., & Silverman, Brian S. (2006). Academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying. Journal of Law and Economics, 49(2), 597–625.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company (1991). 499 US 340.
Gilligan, Thomas, & Krehbiel, Keith (1989). Asymmetric information and legislative rules with heterogeneous committees. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 459–490.
Hall, Richard L., & Wayman, Frank W. (1990). Buying time: moneyed interests and the mobilizations of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science Review, 3, 797–820.
Hall, Richard L. (1998). Participation in congress. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hardin, John W. (1998). Advocacy versus certainty: the dynamics of committee jurisdiction concentration. Journal of Politics, 60(2), 374–397.
Jones, Bryan D., Baumgartner, Frank R., & Talbert, Jeffery C. (1993). The destruction of issue monopolies in congress. American Political Science Review, 87, 657–671.
King, David C. (1994). The nature of congressional committee jurisdictions. The American Political Science Review, 88(1), 48–62.
King, David C. (1997). Turf wars: how congressional committees claim jurisdiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krehbiel, Keith (1992). Information and legislative organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, Keith (1995). Cosponsors and wafflers from A to Z. American Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 906–923.
Kroszner, Randall S., & Strattman, Thomas (2000). Congressional committees as reputation-building mechanisms: repeat PAC giving and seniority on the house banking committee. Business and Politics, 2, 35–52.
Kurtz, Glen S. (2001). Tactical maneuvering on omnibus bills in congress. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 210–223.
McNollgast (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3, 243–277.
Oleszek, Walter J. (2001). The internet and congressional decisionmaking. A report prepared for the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, September 19. CRS.
Oleszek, Walter J. (2004). Congressional procedures and the policy process. Washington: CQ Press.
Snyder, James (1991). On buying legislatures. Economics and Politics, 3(2), 93–109.
Talbert, Jeffery, Jones, Bryan, & Baumgartner, Frank (1995). Non-legislative hearings and policy change in congress. American Journal of Political Science, 39, 383–406.
Weingast, Barry R., & Marshall, William (1988). The industrial organization of congress; or, why legislature, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 132–196.
Weingast, B., & Moran, P. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission. Journal of Political Economy, 91, 765–800.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
de Figueiredo, J.M. Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes. Public Choice 154, 119–137 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9813-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9813-z