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Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system

Abstract

Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules.

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Correspondence to Diana Thomas.

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Martin, A., Thomas, D. Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system. Public Choice 154, 21–37 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9805-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9805-z

Keywords

  • Entrepreneurship
  • Congressional committee system
  • Collective action
  • Institutions

JEL Classification

  • L26
  • D71
  • D72
  • D02