The paper analyzes the impact of natural resource abundance on selected governance indicators. We use a panel data set with observations on a large number of countries over an extended period of time and employ an instrumental variable technique to account for endogeneity. The results show that exports of natural resources have, above all, led to an increase in corruption. This result is robust to both different model specifications and an alternative indicator for natural resource abundance. For other governance indicators, such as law and order and bureaucratic quality, we either find no results or results that lack robustness.
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Busse, M., Gröning, S. The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources. Public Choice 154, 1–20 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9804-0
- Natural resources
- Resource curse