Abstract
If the defendant in a lawsuit is better informed than the plaintiff about the value of damages that could potentially be assigned by the court, biasing the burden of proof toward the plaintiff may lower aggregate efficiency losses from litigation.
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Wärneryd, K. Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation. Public Choice 153, 279–285 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9793-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9793-z