Abstract
We compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their abilities to produce Pareto superior and Pareto optimal alternatives in fixed number of rounds of voting using a two-dimensional spatial voting model with random proposals, sincere proposals, and strategic proposals. Our findings show that for random or sincere proposals, majority rule is at least as likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome as unanimity rule. For strategic proposals, the subgame perfect equilibrium under unanimity rule is Pareto optimal. For other k-majority rules, the outcome is Pareto optimal or very close to it. For outcomes that are both Pareto optimal and Pareto superior, unanimity rule outperforms majority rule.
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Dougherty, K.L., Edward, J. Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis. Public Choice 151, 655–678 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9763-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9763-5