As an alternative to the environmental cartel approach, we assume that an international environmental agreement aims simply at providing a collective response to a perceived threat. Given this less demanding concept of cooperation and considering that most treaties become enforceable only after ratification by a sufficient number of participants, we examine the set of self-enforceable agreements. This set contains first-best but also second-best agreements that do not maximize the collective welfare of members but meet environmental and/or participative requirements. We study the properties of this set and discuss admissible values of targets and thresholds that favour economics over environmental objectives and vice versa.
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An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9918-z.
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Courtois, P., Haeringer, G. Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements. Public Choice 151, 565–584 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9759-6
- International environmental agreement
- Social welfare
- Abatement bound
- Ratification threshold