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Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Abstract

The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

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Correspondence to Terry D. Clark.

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Casey, P.C., Wierman, M.J., Gibilisco, M.B. et al. Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences. Public Choice 151, 409–423 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

Keywords

  • Fuzzy set theory
  • Fuzzy spatial models
  • Veto players theory
  • Government formation process
  • Iraq