Public Choice

, Volume 151, Issue 1–2, pp 91–119 | Cite as

Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games

  • Sabrina Teyssier


Behavioral hypotheses have recently been introduced into public-choice theory (Ostrom in American Political Science Review 92:1–22, 1998). Nevertheless, the individual intrinsic preferences which drive decisions in social dilemmas have not yet been empirically identified. This paper asks whether risk and inequity preferences are behind agents’ behavior in a sequential public good game. The experimental results show that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the contribution decision of first movers. Second movers who are averse to advantageous inequity free-ride less and reciprocate more than do others. Our results emphasize the importance of strategic uncertainty for the correct understanding of which preferences influence cooperation in social dilemmas.


Inequity aversion Risk aversion Public good game Conditional cooperation Strategic uncertainty 

JEL Classification

C72 C91 D63 D81 H41 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.INRA, UR1303 ALISSIvry-sur-SeineFrance

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