Communication in committees: who should listen?

Abstract

In a parsimonious model of a collective decision problem with partially conflicting interests, we show that restricting communication may enhance decision quality. If disclosed information is observed by decision makers with different preferences, individuals may strategically withhold information. In this case, a committee member’s silence arouses the other members’ suspicions. As a consequence, in case of residual uncertainty, individual votes may react less to information that is publicly observed.

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Correspondence to Elisabeth Schulte.

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Schulte, E. Communication in committees: who should listen?. Public Choice 150, 97–117 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9691-9

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Keywords

  • Committees
  • Communication
  • Preference heterogeneity

JEL Classification

  • D71
  • D83