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Oil and the duration of dictatorships

Abstract

Theoretical models do not reach an unambiguous conclusion concerning the effects of natural resource endowment on the duration of dictatorial regimes. We assess empirically, for the first time, the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic leaders. Using a dataset comprising information for 106 dictators, our empirical analysis indicates that dictators in countries which are relatively better endowed in terms of oil tend to stay longer in office. The result is robust to changes in the definition of dictatorial regimes and in the specifications used in the econometric analysis.

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Correspondence to Harald Oberhofer.

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Crespo Cuaresma, J., Oberhofer, H. & Raschky, P.A. Oil and the duration of dictatorships. Public Choice 148, 505–530 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9671-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9671-0

Keywords

  • Natural resources
  • Dictatorship
  • Political economy
  • Duration

JEL Classification

  • Q34
  • D72
  • H11