Social divisions and institutions: assessing institutional parameter variation
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This paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions. It argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness, which in turn should depress institutional payoffs. Absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions, social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income. The empirical results support this hypothesis, and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large.
KeywordsProperty rights Institutions Social divisions Parameter heterogeneity
JEL ClassificationO10 O17 P14 P26
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