Public Choice

, Volume 143, Issue 3–4, pp 293–301 | Cite as

Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons

Article

Abstract

This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.

Keywords

Ostrom Commons Self-governance 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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