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City-level analysis of the effect of political regimes on public good provision

Abstract

This paper uses U.S. city-level data on five public expenditure categories to test empirically whether the form of local government affects the amount of public good provision. This also serves as an empirical test of a theory of national politics that predicts higher provision of public good in parliamentary than in presidential regimes. The robust results indicate that: at the city level, the mayor-council form of government provides significantly more public good than the council-manager form of government for two of the public expenditure categories; and, at the national level, presidential regimes provide more public good than do parliamentary regimes.

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Correspondence to Sarani Saha.

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Saha, S. City-level analysis of the effect of political regimes on public good provision. Public Choice 147, 155–171 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9609-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9609-6

Keywords

  • Public good
  • Form of government
  • Parliamentary system
  • Presidential system
  • Mayor-council system
  • Council-manager system