Abstract
The line-item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending. A model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive’s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods. The item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature.
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Indridason, I.H. Executive veto power and credit claiming. Public Choice 146, 375–394 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9595-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9595-8