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Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of public capital productivity

Abstract

We study the impact of tenure in office on economic performance. We evaluate the relationships between tenure in office and GDP growth, public capital growth, and public capital productivity using data for Spanish regions during the period 1980–1998. We find that tenure decreases the impact of public capital growth on GDP growth. Our results suggest that tenure affects GDP growth negatively through a decrease in public capital productivity.

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Correspondence to María García-Vega.

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García-Vega, M., Herce, J.A. Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of public capital productivity. Public Choice 146, 75–92 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9584-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9584-y

Keywords

  • Tenure in office
  • Public capital productivity
  • GDP growth
  • Regional governments

JEL Classification

  • D70
  • H11
  • H50
  • O18