Public Choice

, Volume 145, Issue 3–4, pp 339–349 | Cite as

Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games

  • Nicolas TreichEmail author


This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n=2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model.

Risk-aversion Rent-seeking Lobbying Uncertainty Prudence Self-protection 

JEL Classification

C72 D72 D81 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA-INRA)ToulouseFrance

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