Abstract
We consider a two-period model in which politicians differ in their motivations, and show that a good politician may suboptimally provide a public good that gives an immediate payoff because if he provided one that gives a payoff only in the second term, the citizens would consider it sufficiently likely that he is a bad politician and, therefore, they would not reelect him. Quite surprisingly, such short-termism may be socially optimal: it increases the probability that the office will be held in the future by a good politician and induces a bad politician to act more in the public interest.
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Garrì, I. Political short-termism: a possible explanation. Public Choice 145, 197–211 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9561-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9561-5