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Who will deregulate the deregulators?

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Abstract

A well-intentioned and fully informed regulator may determine that the optimal policy is to deregulate the market, yet the regulator may be constrained from doing so. In this condition, deregulatory policies originate in exogenous shocks to the regulator’s choice environment. Entrepreneurship in political and economic markets is a primary source of institutional change that promotes deregulation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, San Jose State University, One Washington Square, San Jose, CA, 95112, USA

    Edward J. López

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  1. Edward J. López
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Correspondence to Edward J. López.

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López, E.J. Who will deregulate the deregulators?. Public Choice 142, 379–384 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9537-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9537-5

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