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Less fighting than expected

Experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

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Abstract

While all-pay auctions are well researched experimentally, we do not have much laboratory evidence on wars of attrition. This paper tries to fill this gap. Technically, there are only a few differences between wars of attrition and all-pay auctions. Behaviorally, however, we find striking differences: As many studies, our experiment finds overbidding in all-pay auctions. In contrast, in wars of attrition we observe systematic underbidding.

We study bids and expenditures in different experimental frames and matching procedures and tie in with the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Hannah Hörisch

  2. School of Economics, University of Jena, Carl-Zeiß-Str. 3, 07743, Jena, Germany

    Oliver Kirchkamp

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  1. Hannah Hörisch
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  2. Oliver Kirchkamp
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Correspondence to Oliver Kirchkamp.

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Hörisch, H., Kirchkamp, O. Less fighting than expected. Public Choice 144, 347–367 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9523-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9523-y

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