Abstract
The Confederate Congress passed draconian trade legislation in February 1864 to regulate the blockade running business in contrast to their free trade agenda. This legislation created higher prices and deadweight costs except in areas under Union control. We examine the series of votes and proposed amendments relating to the passage of this legislation and find that representatives were more likely to vote for trade regulations if their districts would be largely unaffected by the legislation, such as those districts under Union occupation. This private interest explanation provides a heretofore unexplored historical example of public choice theory under extreme conditions.
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Ekelund, R.B., Jackson, J.D. & Thornton, M. Desperation votes and private interests: an analysis of Confederate trade legislation. Public Choice 144, 199–214 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9511-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9511-2