Abstract
‘Condorcet cycles’ (or ‘paradoxes of cyclical majorities’) are an empirically rare phenomenon. A referendum in the Swiss canton of Bern on 28 November 2004 presents a rare occurrence. This study presents a new multi-option referendum procedure that makes Condorcet cycles visible, and it argues that in this case, the paradox might have resulted from strategic voting patterns.
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Bochsler, D. The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern. Public Choice 144, 119–131 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9507-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9507-y