Abstract
The German parliament in the Weimar Republic was very instable and governments did not last long. Historical research has tried to determine what caused this instability. Those historical hypotheses are re-examined by studying a completely new dataset covering 489 roll-call-bills in the parliament during the 14 years in question. According to the findings of this study it is very unlikely that it was only the system, its conditions and its actors that caused instability and that the reasons rather have to be found outside parliament.
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Lehmann, S.H. Chaotic shop-talk or efficient parliament? The Reichstag, the parties, and the problem of governmental instability in the Weimar Republic. Public Choice 144, 83–104 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9505-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9505-0