Abstract
Members of political parties may influence each other. For example, a liberal in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the party may become more liberal. Voters in a district who favor such effects may care about the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who affiliates with a party over an independent with the same position.
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Abbreviations
- M j :
-
Membership of party j
- n :
-
Number of districts other than the one under consideration
- V i :
-
Ideal point of voter in district i
- V j0 :
-
Initial ideology of candidate from district j
- V j1 :
-
Induced ideology of the MC from district j
- w :
-
Weight in voter’s utility function reflecting externality from MC’s ideologies in other districts.
- λ :
-
Weight affecting MC’s induced ideal point
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I am grateful to a referee and to the associate editor for comments which allowed me to improve the paper.
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Glazer, A. Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties. Public Choice 144, 53–62 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9503-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9503-2