Public Choice

, Volume 141, Issue 1–2, pp 233–267 | Cite as

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

  • Axel Dreher
Open Access
Literature Survey


This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.


IMF Conditionality Compliance Implementation 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of GoettingenGoettingenGermany

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